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Reed: Who Determines What Is Egregious? Judge or Jury: Enhanced Damages

WHO DETERMINES WHAT IS EGREGIOUS?
JUDGE OR JURY: ENHANCED DAMAGES AFTER
HALO V. PULSE
Brandon M. Reed*
INTRODUCTION
Enhanced damages in patent law are a type of punitive damage
that can be awarded in the case of “egregious misconduct” during the
course of patent infringement.1 Authorization for enhanced damages
comes from 35 U.S.C. § 284, which allows the district court to
increase total damages up to three times the amount of actual
damages found by the jury.2 It is well understood that, since
enhanced damages are punitive in nature, enhancement should only
be considered for cases of “wanton” or “deliberate” infringement.3
However, determining what constitutes this “egregious” misconduct
has vastly transformed over time to include a negligence standard, a
*J.D. Candidate 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Yaniv
Heled whose advice influenced the creation and development of this topic. I would also like to thank the
members of the Georgia State University Law Review for their outstanding editing. I would also like to
thank my wife, Anna, for her love and support throughout law school. Finally, I would like to thank my
son Harrison. Although he is still too young to know it, I will forever be grateful for his love and
laughter during my third year of school.
1. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (2016) (“Courts of Appeals
likewise characterized enhanced damages as justified where the infringer acted deliberately or
willfully . . . .”); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 710,
722 (D. Del. 2011) (“Enhanced damages not only operate as a punitive measure against individual
infringing defendants, but they also serve an overarching purpose as a deterrence of patent
infringement.”).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.
In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”).
The term “treble damages” is used throughout case law due to the court’s ability, by statute, to triple the
amount of actual damages. See Treble Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
3. See, e.g., Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (holding enhanced damages when the infringement was
“willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—
characteristic of a pirate”); Power Specialty Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 80 F.2d 874, 878
(2d Cir. 1936) (“There is no justification for punitive damages here as upon wanton, deliberate, and
willful infringement.”); Baseball Display Co. v. Star Ballplayer Co., 35 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1929)
(“[T]here should be allowed damages on them, proven to be in excess of profits and, because of the
deliberate and willful infringement . . . .”).
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two-prong recklessness standard, and recently a court-discretion
standard.4
In the 2007 In re Seagate decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit sought to clarify what determined willful
infringement, creating a two-part test for enhanced damages.5 The
first part of the Seagate test asked whether the infringer acted
“despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement.”6 The second part asked whether, subjectively, “the
risk of infringement ‘was either known or so obvious that it should
have been known to the accused infringer.’”7 The Federal Circuit
considered the test’s objective prong a question of law for a judge,
and considered the subjective prong a question of fact for the jury.8
Although Seagate guided district courts for nearly a decade, many
opponents of the test considered the two-prong inquiry “unduly
rigid,” thus “insulating some of the worst patent infringers from any
liability for enhanced damages.”9 As a result, the Supreme Court
4. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (denying any rigid formula for determining enhanced damages and
instead leaving the determination to the discretion of the district court); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497
F.3d 1360, 1370, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (creating a two-prong test that requires first a showing
of objective recklessness by the infringer, and then a subjective belief by the infringer of potential
infringement), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Underwater
Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (creating an “affirmative
duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing”), overruled by In re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
5. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930 (discussing the test created in In re Seagate to establish the case for
willful infringement).
6. Id.
7. Id. (quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371) (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
8. Sadao Kinsahi, Seagate Objective-Reckless Standard is Question of Law to be Decided By Judge
and Subject to De Novo Review, WESTERMAN HATTORI DANIELS & ADRIAN, LLP (June 28, 2012),
http://cafc.whda.com/2012/06/seagate-objective-reckless-standard-is-question-of-law-to-be-decided-byjudge-and-subject-to-de-novo-review/ [https://perma.cc/R2E4-CKGU] (summarizing that the Federal
Circuit decision In re Seagate holds the subjective prong is a question of fact for the jury to decide, but
the objective prong is purely a legal question to be determined by the judge). The determination that
there were separate questions of law and fact was not inherent after In re Seagate. The Federal Circuit
confirmed this assessment by stating “the objective determination of recklessness, even though
predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, is best decided by the judge as a question of
law . . . .” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
9. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932; see also Colin Hendricks & David Breiner, Patent Pirates Beware:
Enhanced Damages after Halo, BROWNWINICK (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.brownwinick.com/newsblogs/intellectual-property-blog/patent-pirates-beware-enhanced-damages-after-halo.aspx
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abrogated the test with its 2016 decision Halo Electronics v. Pulse
Electronics.10 Instead of creating a new test or determining how a
judge or jury should decide whether enhanced damages are
appropriate, the Supreme Court left the decision up to the discretion
of the district courts.11 With this decision, the two-part framework no
longer provides instruction on who decides whether to award
enhanced damages.12 Without guidance on whether the judge or the
jury determines whether to award enhanced damages, defendants will
become increasingly uncertain of whether the court will find
“egregious cases of misconduct” in “garden-variety cases” of
infringement.13 This Note discusses the impact of Halo v. Pulse on
determining whether a judge or a jury decides whether willful,
egregious misconduct justifies enhanced damages under
35 U.S.C. § 284.
Part I of this Note introduces Section 284 of the Patent Act,
examines the tests created by the Federal Circuit, and discusses
[https://perma.cc/8EC4-48LT] (“Seagate allowed patent pirates to avoid ‘walking the plank’ of
enhanced damages after choosing to purposefully infringe on a valid patent.”); Drew Meunier, Supreme
Court Decision Impacts Product Launch Strategy, MEUNIER CARLIN & CURFMAN LLC (June 24, 2016),
http://www.mcciplaw.com/blog/supreme-court-decision-impacts-product-launch-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/5WX4-AQ9L] (“[T]he Seagate test . . . allowed an accused infringer to avoid enhanced
damages by raising a substantial question as to the validity or non-infringement of the patent, even if he
was not aware of the arguable defense when he acted.”).
10. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (abrogating the two-part Seagate test for enhanced damages).
11. Id. at 1928 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)) (“Section 284
gives district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages against those guilty of patent
infringement. In applying this discretion, district courts are ‘to be guided by [the] sound legal principles’
developed over nearly two centuries of application and interpretation of the Patent Act.”).
12. See Howard Wisnia & Thomas Jackman, Reconsidering the Standard for Enhanced Damages in
Patent Cases in View of Recent Guidance from the Supreme Court, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
461, 473 (2015) (arguing that willfulness was historically considered a question of fact entirely for the
jury to decide). The question is now whether the courts should refer to historical precedent for
determining willful infringement, or whether Halo has created a new standard. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at
1928 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s appellate framework separating question of law and question of
fact in determination of enhanced damages).
13. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933, 1935 (guiding the district court to only find for enhanced damages
in the case of “egregious” misconduct); see also Brian E. Ferguson, So Long, Seagate: A New Test for
Willful
Patent
Infringement,
LAW360
(June
14,
2016,
5:45
PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/771835/so-long-seagate-a-new-test-for-willful-patent-infringement
[https://perma.cc/M62M-GW49] (discussing the great deal of uncertainty with an “egregious
misconduct” test, and stating that companies may begin to settle rather than be subject to enhanced
damages for “garden-variety” infringement).
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historical interpretations of whether a judge or a jury should impose
enhanced damages.14 Part II discusses the arguments made for
allowing a judge or a jury to assess enhanced damages.15 Part III
discusses a proposal for having the judge consider the issue of
enhanced damages by holding a post-trial, Enhanced Damages
hearing to determine the egregiousness of the case.16
I. Background
Although enhanced damages became a staple of patent law in
1793,17 the method of applying the remedy has changed drastically
since its inception more than 220 years ago.18 Enhanced damages
started as a mandatory trebling for all infringements, and progressed
to a discretionary standard until Congress created the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.19 Over the past thirty years,
the Federal Circuit altered the issue’s determination by first creating
a legal duty and then progressing to the two-part objective and
subjective test.20 Most recently, however, the Supreme Court rejected
the Federal Circuit’s strenuous tests and gave district courts
discretion regarding enhanced damages.21 District courts are
therefore left with broad discretion on enhanced damages and little
guidance on how willfulness plays into their determination.22

14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (defining the new factor as “egregious misconduct,” and stating not
all egregious misconduct may require a reward of enhanced damages); see also infra Part III.
17. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793) (creating the first account of treble
damages on the finding of infringement).
18. See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B; see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (creating the two-part test to determine enhanced damages); Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (creating a duty to obtain advice
from counsel regarding potential infringing activity).
21. See infra Part I.C; see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (creating the discretionary standard for
enhanced damages).
22. See infra Part I.C.
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A. Creating Discretion for Enhanced Damages
Enhanced damages in patent law are “[d]amages for patent
infringement in an amount up to three times that of compensatory
damages, at the discretion of the court, based on the egregiousness of
the defendant’s conduct, including the willfulness of the
infringement.”23 Although the origins of enhanced damages trace
back nearly to the ratification of the United States Constitution,24 the
process for determining enhanced damages has changed over the past
220 years.25 The Patent Act of 1793 contained the first substantial
legislation regarding enhanced damages.26 In the Act, treble
damages—enhanced damages up to three times the amount of actual
damages—were mandatory and automatically applied to the
judgment in any case where the jury found infringement.27 With this
new system in place, the infringer’s state of mind was irrelevant; if
the jury found infringement, the damages awarded were tripled.28
23. Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
24. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928.
25. See id. (discussing the difference between the Patent Act of 1793 and 1836); Seymour v.
McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1853) (discussing the changes to enhanced damages between The
Patent Act of 1790, The Patent Act of 1793, and The Patent Act of 1836).
26. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 320, 322 (1793). Note that the Patent Act of
1793 was not the first patent act passed by Congress. The Patent Act of 1790 essentially established the
terms of patents, the process for application, and the eligible subject matter, among other things. It did
not mention enhanced damages, but only that an infringer “shall forfeit and pay to the said patentee or
patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a
jury.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11 (1790).
27. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793). The section states:
That if any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing so invented,
the exclusive right of which shall, as aforesaid, have been secured to any
person by patent, without the consent of the patentee, his executors,
administrators or assigns, first obtained in writing, every person so
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least
equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or
licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention; which may be
recovered in an action on the case founded on this act, in the circuit court
of the United States, or any other court having competent jurisdiction.
Id.
28. See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488 (“The defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith, claiming
under a junior patent, was made liable to the same penalty with the wanton and malicious pirate.”). The
original Patent Act of 1793 assessed damages by determining what a normal license would be for the
patent holder, plus a forfeiture against the defendant in an amount three times that sum. Id. However, the
Act of 1800 changed the assessment to actual damages plus a forfeiture by the defendant in an amount
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Therefore, in this early system, neither the judge nor the jury had the
discretion to determine whether, upon the merits of the case,
enhanced damages were appropriate.29
The Supreme Court and Congress both came to the realization that
trebling damages in all cases would lead to punishing good-faith
infringement.30 In the Patent Act of 1836, Congress, therefore,
removed the mandatory language and made enhanced damages
discretionary.31 Trial judges, with the new-found discretion to
enhance damages, retained control of the decision to enter a
judgment for enhanced damages against a defendant for more than a
century.32 Although a determination of “willfulness,” per se, was not
yet part of the enhanced damages assessment,33 historically it is clear
equal to three times the sum of the actual damages. Id.
29. See id. at 488–89 (discussing the “injustice” of treating all infringers the same and the change in
1836 to make enhanced damages discretionary); see also Evans v. Hettich, 20 U.S. 453, 453 (1822)
(emphasis added) (“[I]f you should find a verdict for the plaintiff, you will give the actual damages
which the plaintiff has sustained, by reason of the defendant’s use of his invention, which the Court will
treble.”); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1018 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) (emphasis added) (“If the
jury should be in favour of the plaintiffs upon these points, they will find for the plaintiffs the actual
damages sustained by them, by reason of the use by the defendants of the discovery to which they are
entitled; which the court will treble.”).
30. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488–89 (discussing the injustice of a “horizontal” rule applying to all
infringement and arguing that Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1836 to “obviate this injustice”);
Stephanie Pall, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically Sound? A Proposal to Restore Willful
Infringement to its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 666 (2006) (arguing
Congress’s idea of treble damages “evolved from concerns about adequate compensation to the current
focus on punitive damages as a deterrent mechanism”).
31. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836) (emphasis added) (“[I]t shall be in
the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found by such a verdict as the
actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the
circumstances of the case . . . .”).
32. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489 (“The power to inflict vindictive or punitive damages is committed to
the discretion and judgment of the court within the limit of trebling the actual damages found by the
jury.”); Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Gilbert, 269 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[W]e could not find it an
abuse of discretion if the judge had trebled the defendant’s profits . . . .”); Vaughan v. Central Pac. R.
Co., 28 F. Cas. 1107 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877) (No. 16, 987) (“[A plaintiff] may recover a penalty to the extent
of treble damages, if the judge sees fit to inflict it.”); Stimpson v. R.R., 23 F. Cas. 103 (3d Cir. 1847)
(No. 13,456) (“[T]he court are [sic] not compelled to treble the actual damages assessed by the jury, but
may increase them or not at their discretion within that limit.”).
33. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489 (using the terms wanton and malicious to determine if enhanced
damages are appropriate). The term “willfulness” did not become a staple until more than a century after
the court gained discretion to enhance damages. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D.
Cal. 1958) (emphasis added) (“The absence of willfulness, of course, would call for the denial of treble
damages.”).
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that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
determination of enhanced damages was a question of law for the
judge.34
B. Willfulness and the Federal-Circuit Era
The Patent Act of 1952 created Section 284, which gives the courts
statutory authority to enhance damages.35 Although the new Act
clarified the language of the enhanced-damages provision, how
courts assessed the damages remained unchanged from the Act of
1836.36 Around the time of the Federal Circuit’s establishment in
1982,37 the notion of “willfulness” in patent infringement started to
gain recognition as a question of fact.38 Under this assessment of
willfulness, it would seem logical that the determination to enhance
damages would be left solely to the jury.39 Considering the due
process rights of an alleged infringer, “[o]ur system of law generally
subscribes to the precept that questions of law are determined by a
34. Contra Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“The ultimate question of willfulness has long been treated as a question of fact.”); Wisnia
& Jackman, supra note 12, at 473 (“Historically, courts, including the Federal Circuit, have treated the
willfulness determination under § 284 as entirely a question of fact for the jury.”).
35. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284)
(stating that the statute in force after the Act of 1952 did not substantively change the law that existed
prior to the Act, including the treble provision as it existed in 1836), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v.
Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
36. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016) (stating that the changes
made in 1952 were to clarify the language, but treating the assessment of willfulness consistent with this
history and precedent regarding patent damages).
37. See infra note 146 (discussing the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
38. See Creative Cookware, Inc. v. Northland Aluminum Prods., 678 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 1982)
(stating that the issue of willfulness is a question of fact, and holding the remainder of the matters in the
case were to be reviewed by the abuse-of-discretion standard upon appeal); see also Leinoff v. Louis
Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The trial court may award increased
damages, in its discretion, upon proof of willful and wanton infringement. The willfulness of
infringement is a question of fact.”). The notion of willfulness being a question of fact surfaced as early
as 1969; however, the frequency in which the notion was addressed as a question of fact increased after
1982. See Malco Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Connector Corp., No. 4-61 Civ.243, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10554,
at *8–9 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 1969) (mentioning that willfulness of infringement is a question of fact).
39. See Alan N. Herda, Notes and Comments: Willful Patent Infringement and the Right to a Jury
Trial, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 181, 199 (2003) (“[A] jury determination is necessary because the
finding of willfulness is analogous to a jury determining whether to award punitive damages in actions
tried at law in 1791. Therefore, the historical test proves that the Seventh Amendment right extends to a
jury determination on willfulness in patent infringement suits.”).
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judge, while questions of fact are determined by a jury.”40 However,
despite the understanding that willfulness is factual, judges regularly
made the determination alone.41
Regardless of who determines infringement’s willfulness, in
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., the Federal
Circuit—within the first year of its existence—attempted to settle at
least what constituted willful infringement by applying a duty of due
care.42 The Federal Circuit offered the guidance that there is a “duty
to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the
initiation of any possible infringing activity.”43 By creating a test that
mirrors a negligence standard, the Federal Circuit seemed to bolster
the argument that willfulness is a question of fact for the jury.44 The
Circuit’s new test considerably weakened the standard for enhanced
damages, and plaintiffs began to abuse the low-cost, high-reward
activity of asking for the punitive-type damages in every
infringement case.45 The standard particularly affected the case if the
jury decided whether to enhance damages, because failing to obtain
counsel created a presumption of willfulness.46 If the jury already

40. Kristin K. Woodward, Owners and Occupiers of Land Now Owe Those Lawfully on Their
Premises a Duty of Reasonable Care Under Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51
(1996), 76 NEB. L. REV. 184, 201 (1997).
41. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 393 (2000) (discussing the differing outcomes between a judge and a jury
determination of willfulness, as well as discussing the factors used by the judge to determine
willfulness, including deliberate infringement).
42. See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (instituting a duty of due care on the infringer to show that she sought and obtained legal advice
about possible infringing activity), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
43. Id. at 1390.
44. See Bronson v. Oakes, 76 F. 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 1896) (“[N]egligence is a question of fact for
the jury, and it does not cease to be such although the facts are undisputed, for that would be to deprive
a suitor of his constitutional right to have the material facts in his case tried by a jury.”).
45. See Justin P. Huddleson, Objectively Reckless: A Semi-Empirical Evaluation of In re Seagate, 15
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 125 (2009) (discussing how litigants were using enhanced damages as a
litigation strategy rather than affording a possibility of increasing damages).
46. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1091–92 (2003) (discussing the impact of failing to obtain counsel on the
ultimate issue of infringement).
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found infringement, then a finding of willfulness would be a much
easier assessment for the jury.47
In order to strengthen the analysis for willfulness and abandon the
negligence standard established in Underwater Devices, the Federal
Circuit created a new standard with their 2007 decision, In re
Seagate.48 The court created a two-part test to determine enhanced
damages.49 The first part of the test was an objective analysis
requiring “a patentee [to] show by clear and convincing evidence that
the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”50 The court
considered the second prong only if the patentee satisfied the
“objective recklessness” prong.51 The second, subjective prong
required the plaintiff to “demonstrate that this objectively-defined
risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it should have been
known to the accused infringer.”52 The court instructed that the first
prong—objective recklessness—was a question of law for the judge,
while the second prong—subjective risk—was a question of fact for
the jury.53 The court reasoned, in Bard Peripheral Vascular v. W.L.
Gore, that the judge “is in the best position for making the
determination of reasonableness” and left the willfulness analysis to
both the judge and the jury in their respective parts of the test.54

47. Id. (“While [the] presumptions are rebuttable, in practice they are likely to have a strong impact
on a jury that has just concluded that the patent is valid and the defendant an infringer.”).
48. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he duty of care announced in
Underwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that is more akin to negligence.”),
abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Alex Czanik, Willful Patent
Infringement: Bard v. W.L. Gore’s Thoughtful Shift from Jury to Judge, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 283, 287
(2013) (“Underwater Devices’s low standard failed to align with willfulness in the civil context and was
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.”).
49. Czanik, supra note 48, at 287 (“Seagate established a two-prong test that still serves as the
backbone for willful patent infringement.”).
50. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
51. Czanik, supra note 48, at 288.
52. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
53. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“The court now holds that the threshold objective prong of the willfulness standard enunciated in
Seagate is a question of law based on underlying mixed questions of law and fact and is subject to de
novo review.”); Wisnia & Jackman, supra note 12, at 474.
54. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1006.
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C. Abrogation of the Seagate Test by Halo v. Pulse
The Seagate test seemed to accomplish its intended goal: the abuse
of unfounded willful-infringement claims decreased because it was
much more difficult for a patent holder to prove both objective
recklessness and subjective belief in the risk of infringement.55
However, many people, particularly patent holders, thought the rule
was too rigid and the test let many potential bad-faith infringers off
the hook by merely making a colorful invalidity argument against the
claims in question.56
Two cases caused the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the
issue of willfulness.57 In the first case, Halo Electronics sued Pulse
Electronics for infringement of patents Halo held regarding electronic
packages.58 Although the jury found a high probability of willful
infringement, the district court declined to enhance the damages
because Pulse provided a reasonable defense and therefore did not
satisfy the objective recklessness prong of the test.59 In the second
case, Stryker Orthopedics sued Zimmer Orthopedics for infringement
of a surgical device patent.60 The district court awarded treble
damages, noting that Zimmer “all but instructed its design team to
copy Stryker’s products.”61 Still, the Federal Circuit concluded that
enhanced damages were not appropriate because Zimmer offered
“reasonable defenses” at trial.62
In response to the concerns of “malicious” infringers avoiding the
punitive effects of enhanced damages, in June 2016 the Supreme
55. See Ferguson, supra note 13.
56. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016) (“The Seagate test
further errs by making dispositive the ability of the infringer to muster a reasonable defense at trial, even
if he did not act on the basis of that defense or was even aware of it.”); Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 2,
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 14-1513), 2015 WL 9450143, at *2
(“The Federal Circuit’s rigid per se rule ties the hands of judges and lets bad faith infringers off the
hook.”).
57. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930–31.
58. Id. at 1930.
59. Id. at 1931.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 14-1520, at 77a).
62. Id. at 1931.
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Court abrogated the Seagate test with their Halo v. Pulse decision.63
The Court reasoned that, regardless of any proffered defense,
“Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of
culpable behavior.”64 However, the Court provided no framework for
determining whether to enhance damages.65 Rather, after Halo v.
Pulse, courts now determine enhanced damages solely through their
own discretion.66 The Court offered district courts a single piece of
guidance: enhanced damages should be applied strictly in cases of
egregious misconduct.67
The new discretionary standard leaves litigants without a firm test
for enhanced damages.68 Questions remain as to how the new
standard will play out in the district courts and the Federal Circuit.69
Will the assessment revert to enhancing damages only if the judge
sees fit to enforce them?70 If a jury decides, will a duty of due care
resurface to persuade a jury that the infringement was willful?71
Furthermore, does it even matter whether a judge or a jury decides if
the conduct was egregious if the judge is the one who determines by
how much to increase the damages?72 Since the decision in Halo v.
63. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928.
64. Id. at 1933–34 (discussing the error in providing a rigid framework to determine enhanced
damages when the Act does not prescribe such a test).
65. Id. at 1934 (“[W]e eschew any rigid formula for awarding enhanced damages
under § 284 . . . .”).
66. Id. (quoting Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014))
(“Section 284 gives district courts discretion in meting out enhanced damages. It ‘commits the
determination’ whether enhanced damages are appropriate ‘to the discretion of the district court’ and
‘that decision is to be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.’”).
67. Id. (“Consistent with nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent law, however, such
punishment should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”).
68. See Ferguson, supra note 13 (“The elimination of the Seagate standard and its replacement with
a much more amorphous ‘egregious misconduct’ test is unfortunate because it introduces a great amount
of uncertainty going forward for patent defendants.”).
69. See id. (discussing how companies will now have to speculate how the new standard will play
out and stressing that the Federal Circuit must vigorously enforce “the Supreme Court’s warning that
only instances of true egregious misconduct merit enhanced damages awards”).
70. See Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. Co., 28 F. Cas. 1107, 1107 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877) (No. 16, 987).
71. Ferguson, supra note 13 (“[T]he uncertainty and risk that a garden-variety infringement case
may be distorted by aggressive patentees into one demonstrating egregious misconduct, particularly in
patentee-friendly forums, is acute.”).
72. See Roberta J. Morris, Open Letter to the Supreme Court Concerning Patent Law, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 438, 446 (2001) (“The jury may enter a special verdict on willfulness, but then
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Pulse, the Federal Circuit has already stated that the jury determines
the factual circumstances of “willful infringement.”73 Therefore, the
only understanding afforded litigants is that willfulness is still a
factor when courts analyze “egregious misconduct.”74
II. The Analysis of Judge Versus Jury
There are several approaches to assessing whether a judge or jury
decides an issue.75 The first and most obvious approach determines if
the authorizing statute’s text suggests there is no right to a jury.76 The
second approach considers Seventh Amendment implications, and
Markman v. Westview Instruments provided a test for this approach,
which asks if the issue existed at common law prior to the ratification
of the Seventh Amendment.77 A final approach considers precedent
on the issue before and after the Federal Circuit’s creation, including
previous tests used for determining willfulness.78
A. A Statutory Interpretation of Section 284
Before inquiring whether a statute implicates a constitutional right
to trial by jury, the first inquiry contemplates whether Section 284
the court, not the jury, decides whether to multiply the actual damages by a number between 1 and 3.”).
73. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We do not interpret Halo as
changing the established law that the factual components of the willfulness question should be resolved
by the jury.”).
74. See supra Part I.B (discussing how willfulness as an assessment for enhanced damages gained
prevalence only after the inception of the Federal Circuit).
75. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998) (discussing first the
construction of the statute in an attempt to avoid a Seventh-Amendment analysis and then progressing to
the constitutional analysis); see also infra Part II.A, II.B.
76. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345; see also infra Part II.A.
77. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. The Markman historical test sought to determine if a preexisting
common-law right existed prior to 1791; if one did not, it asked whether a common-law right analogous
to the issue in question existed. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). The
test then progressed to determine if a jury was required to preserve that common-law right. Id.
78. See infra Part II.C. Prior to the Federal Circuit, a determination of willfulness was vested solely
with the district court judge. See supra Part I.A. Furthermore, precedent from the Fifth Circuit, prior to
the Federal Circuit, suggests there is no right to trial by jury for enhanced damages. See Swofford v. B
& W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964) (“No discretion is vested in the jury . . . .”). Lastly, the
case Read Corp. v. Portec, heard by the Federal Circuit, suggested nine factors to use in determining
egregiousness of the case. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Part I.C.
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even suggests a judge may solely decide to enhance damages.79 The
relevant clause of Section 284 regarding enhanced damages states,
“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess
them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.”80 At first glance, the phrase
“the court may” seems to indicate that Congress left the trial judge
discretion to enhance damages above the actual damages already
found.81 In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, the Supreme
Court considered similar “court” language in the context of statutory
damages in copyright law and found that such language did not show
congressional intent to provide a right to trial by jury.82
The language of interest in Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act
included the phrase “the court in its discretion may increase the
award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”83
In Feltner, the Court considered other provisions within the
Copyright Act for guidance as to whether “court” meant judge or
jury.84 The Court considered sections that used “court” in reference
to powers universally understood as vested in the judge—such as
injunctions and awarding attorney fees.85 Looking at relevant
sections surrounding Section 284 of the Patent Act leads to a
conclusion similar to that found in Feltner. First, Section 283 uses

79. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 n.3 (1987) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192
n.6 (1974)) (“We recognize, of course, the ‘cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.’”).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). The statute is preceded by the clause indicating what damages are
appropriate for a finding of infringement. “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court.” Id.
81. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345–46 (holding language in a similar statute for statutory damages in
copyright law that states “the court in its discretion” may find for statutory damages did not show
congressional intent to provide a right to trial by jury).
82. Id.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010).
84. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 346 (stating that other sections of the Copyright Act “use[d] the term ‘court’
in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, rather than a jury”).
85. Id. (noting that other sections include the word “court” while providing discretion to grant
injunctions, destruction of documents, and award attorney fees).
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the phrase “courts” in granting the power to issue injunctions.86
Second, Section 285 uses the term “court” to grant the power to
award attorney fees.87 Third, Section 284 uses the word “jury” within
the statute directly before the word “court.”88 If the word “jury”
means the same as the word “court,” the phrase would read
ambiguously and redundantly.89 Therefore, should the Supreme
Court consider whether Congress intended to grant the right to trial
by jury for enhanced damages, the Court may similarly hold “no,” as
they did in the context of copyright law statutory damages in
Feltner.90
B. Seventh Amendment Implications
1. Introduction to the “Historical Approach”
According to Feltner, after the court determines Congress did not
intend to confer the right to trial by jury in the statute, the next
question is whether the Seventh Amendment nonetheless assures
such a right.91 Although case law has addressed the inquiry of
whether “willfulness” is a question of law or a question of fact,92
neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court has considered the
Seventh Amendment implications.93 The Seventh Amendment to the
86. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured
by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party.”).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess
them.”).
89. Id. The ambiguity is created if “court” meant “jury” because the sentence would read as: when
the damages are not found by the jury, the jury shall assess them. Id.
90. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 347 (“We thus discern no statutory right to a jury trial when a copyright
owner elects to recover statutory damages.”).
91. Id. at 345 (discussing Seventh Amendment implications only after determining the statute did
not grant the right of trial by jury).
92. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that willfulness is a
question of fact set by the Federal Circuit’s precedent); see also Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing willfulness as a mixed of a
question of law and of fact).
93. Herda, supra note 39, at 183 (“[T]he Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court with
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United States Constitution confers a right to trial by jury by stating,
“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”94
One test to determine if a right to trial by jury applies to an issue
comes from the landmark case Markman v. Westview Instruments.95
The test consists of:
[D]etermining: (1) whether the current cause of action
either was a common law action in 1791 England, or is
analogous to a cause of action that was available in 1791,
and (2) whether the issue in question “must fall to the jury
in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right
as it existed in 1791.”96
2. Finding an Analogous Pre-1791 Legal Right to Trial by Jury
To date, the only analysis regarding the existence of a
common-law right to trial by jury on enhanced damages revolves
around the correlation between infringement and willful
infringement.97 This is not to say that “willfulness” is the correct test
for enhanced damages,98 see infra Part II.C, but rather that a Seventh
Amendment analysis on enhanced damages can be made regardless
of what test is appropriate.99 First, the Markman test asks if there was
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, has not answered this constitutional question . . . .”).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
95. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (discussing the
“historical test” used to determine if a cause of action existed prior to the ratification of the United
States Constitution).
96. Herda, supra note 39, at 191 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
376 (1996)).
97. See id. at 193–94 (applying the Markman Test to a question of willful infringement); Wisnia &
Jackman, supra note 12, at 474 (discussing the correlation made to copyright law because the statute at
issue in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures also required a willfulness aspect to the infringement).
98. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016) (stating that egregious
misconduct is typified by willful infringement but not holding that willful infringement is necessary for
enhanced damages); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Whether
the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to warrant enhancement and the amount of the enhancement that
is appropriate are committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”). This distinction is discussed
in detail infra at Part III.A.1.
99. See infra Part II.C; see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1929 (stating that egregious misconduct is
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a cause of action analogous to enhanced damages in England prior to
the Seventh Amendment’s ratification in 1791.100 Scholars disagree
as to whether an issue similar to enhanced damages existed prior to
1791.101 On one hand, if you consider “egregious infringement” a
species of the broader genus of “infringement,” then any
infringement case tried in England prior to 1791 shows a cause of
action for enhanced damages.102 This may not be an accurate way to
look at enhanced damages because “[t]he Seventh Amendment
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the
character of the overall action.”103 The issue to be tried regarding
enhanced damages is whether there was egregious misconduct, not
whether the defendant infringed the claims of the patent.104
Furthermore, enhanced damages were clearly not awarded in the
United States until Congress added the mandatory-trebling provision
to the Act of 1793.105 Encouragement for enhanced damages
essentially came from one man with a distaste for meaningless patent
rights and a distrust for juries.106 Robert Barnes, a man with
connections to Thomas Jefferson and George Washington and with
difficulties enforcing his patent rights, argued that the system prior to
1793 granted no more meaningful rights to patent holders than if
there were no laws at all.107 Further support that enhanced damages

typified by willful infringement, but not going so far as to state that willful infringement is necessary to
show egregious misconduct).
100. See Herda, supra note 39, at 192.
101. See id. (stating the test is easy because patent infringement is statutory and therefore analogous
to statutory infringement suits tried at law in England prior to 1791). But see Wisnia & Jackman, supra
note 12, at 474 (stating that there was no requirement for willfulness in any suit prior to 1791).
102. See Herda, supra note 39, at 192 (correlating the cause of action for infringement to all
sub-issues regarding infringement).
103. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
104. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (stating that enhanced damages are reserved for egregious
misconduct in the case of patent infringement).
105. Supra Part I.A.
106. Samuel Chase Means, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent Law’s Willful
Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999, 2007–08 (2013) (discussing
how Joseph Barnes, a man with strong political ties, argued that patent rights were meaningless without
a stronger right against infringement, thus creating the first mandatory trebling of damages in patent
law).
107. Id. at 2008.
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are a product of post-1791 American Patent law comes from the fact
that “[n]o case was found in which a British jury addressed the issue
of increased awards or punitive damages in a patent infringement
case.”108
3. Preserving the Common-Law Right to Trial by Jury
If enhanced damages have no pre-1791 analogous legal right to a
trial by jury, then the Markman historical test ends, and there is no
right to trial by jury on enhanced damages.109 However, if it is
successfully argued that the legal issue existed in English law prior to
1791, then the next question considers if the issue “must fall to the
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it
existed in 1791.”110
The first argument against a jury trial is that enhanced damages are
not a legal right, but rather an equitable remedy.111 If this is the case,
no trial by jury is necessary to preserve any right because equitable
remedies were historically tried by a judge in England prior to
1791.112 The argument is essentially that the original purpose of
enhanced damages was not only to adequately compensate the patent
holder, but also to prevent ongoing infringement and deter disregard
108. John B. Pegram, The Willful Patent Infringement Dilemma and the 7th Amendment, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 271, 280 (2004) (stating that only one case was found where a jury found
more than nominal damages, but finding no case where a jury was asked to determine punitive damages
or issue an increased award for infringement).
109. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). This is an assumption
that the connector “and” in the test requires both (1) whether the issues was known in England prior to
1791 and (2) whether the issue “must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the commonlaw right as it existed in 1791.” See Herda, supra note 39, at 183 (quoting Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)).
110. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (articulating the two-part test of the Court’s Historical Test).
111. See Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (No. 141520), 2015 WL 8754930 (arguing that the Act of 1793 added enhanced damages as a remedy because
there was no adequate remedy at law). Cf. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,
345–46 (1998) (arguing that statutory damages, in the context of copyright law, are equitable in nature).
112. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 112-9, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: INTERIM EDITION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JULY 1, 2014, at 1679, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOCONAN-REV-2014/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ52-M88R] (stating the
broad proposition that no equitable remedy requires a trial by jury and providing four cases for support).
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for patent rights.113 During Senate hearings on the changes to the Act
of 1836, which changed mandatory trebling to a discretionary
standard, Senator John Ruggles urged that damages alone were
inadequate by stating:
The present law waits till infringements and frauds are
consummated—nay, it even aids them; and then it offers an
inadequate remedy for the injury, by giving an action of
damages. It ought, rather, by refusing to grant interfering
patents, to render prosecutions unnecessary. Instead of
sanctioning the wrong by granting the privilege to commit
it, it should arrest injury and injustice at the threshold, and
put an end to litigation before it begins.114
Senator Ruggles, therefore, considered enhanced damages a
deterrent, and possibly a preventative injunction to the public, rather
than compensation for infringement.115
However, the court generally typifies monetary relief as “legal
relief,” and thus any compensation related to infringement damages
is arguably legal relief.116 The parties in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
argued that statutory damages in copyright law were equitable by
nature.117 The Court did not find this argument persuasive because
they saw all remedies associated with compensation and punishment

113. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 3–4 (“The main reason for mandatory trebling at the time
was Congress’s concern that, because plaintiffs lacked access to equity to prevent ongoing infringement,
actual damages alone were inadequate to compensate patentees and to deter disregard for patent
rights.”).
114. JOHN RUGGLES, S. REP. ACCOMPANYING S.B. NO. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (Apr. 28,
1836), reproduced in CHISUM ON PATENTS, app. 12 (2017).
115. See id.; see also Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a preventative
injunction as “[a]n injunction designed to prevent a loss or injury in the future”).
116. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (“We have recognized the ‘general rule’ that monetary relief is
legal . . . .”); see Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining Equitable Remedy as
“[a] remedy, usu. a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or specific performance, obtained when
available legal remedies, usu. monetary damages, cannot adequately redress the injury”).
117. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (arguing that statutory damages are by nature equitable and not arguing
that they somehow fall outside the presumption that monetary damages are legal remedies).
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as historically legal rights.118 What the respondents in Feltner failed
to argue—which the Court noted—was that there are examples of
monetary relief historically regarded as equitable remedies.119 In
Feltner, the Court mentions that an analogy exists between certain
statutory damages and disgorgement of improper profits, which is an
equitable remedy.120 This argument proves persuasive because
enhanced damages result from egregious misconduct relating to
“malicious” infringement, and courts characterize disgorgement as
“[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained)
on demand or by legal compulsion.”121 However, this argument still
may not stand, as the Supreme Court does not consider disgorgement
equitable if the remedy is also a form of punishment.122
Different methods exist, outside of the legal or equitable
characterization, for ascertaining whether a trial by jury is necessary
to preserve a legal right.123 Two other tests are: (1) to determine if the
issue is a question of law or a question of fact, or (2) to determine if
the issue is analogous to another, similar common-law issue.124
Considering the first test, the inquiry is whether “egregious
misconduct” is a question of law or a question of fact.125 Before June
2016, this question had an answer.126 The Seagate test was a twopronged test, where one prong was subjective and a question of fact,
118. Id. at 353 (arguing precedent shows actual damages, remedies intended to punish, and exemplary
damages in divorce were all issues held to be historically legal issues for a jury).
119. Id. at 352 (stating that respondents, Columbia, did not argue or try to draw an analogy between
statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) and causes of action such as disgorgement of improper
profits that are characterized as equitable relief).
120. Id.
121. See Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
122. Cf. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 423 (1987). The argument may be sound that enhanced
damages are similar to disgorgement of improper profits; however, Tull suggests that, when such a relief
is also used to impose punishment, it is more akin to equitable relief. Id.
123. Herda, supra note 39, at 193 (discussing two different tests to determine if an issue is to the
“substance of the common-law right”).
124. Id. at 192 (“Two such methods are distinguishing between issues of law and fact, and comparing
the issues in question to analogous common law issues in 1791 England—a historical test of the issue
within the overall historical test of both the action and the issue.”).
125. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (stating that egregious
misconduct is the standard under which enhanced damages should be reviewed).
126. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Seagate two-prong test and the analysis made as to whether
egregious misconduct is a question of fact or question of law).
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and the other prong was objective and a question of law.127 However,
the decision in Halo v. Pulse abrogated that test, and now there is no
longer a multi-part framework to determine enhanced damages.128
Regardless, questions of fact do remain when deciding if “egregious
misconduct” exists.129 However, as seen in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, when the matter “falls somewhere between a pristine
legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at
times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question.”130 Therefore, even though an
issue may present a question of fact, the line between fact and law is
probably not so bright-lined that it precludes the issue from judicial
determination.131
Another approach, other than asking if the inquiry is a question of
law or fact, determines whether any common-law issues existing in
1791 are analogous to enhanced damages.132 One clear case is that
enhanced damages are most similar to punitive damages.133 Courts
consistently consider enhanced damages as a type of punitive
damage.134 Punitive damages existed in England prior to 1791, and in
127. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (maintaining that the subjective threshold remains a question of fact for the jury, but holding that
the “threshold objective prong of the willfulness standard enunciated in Seagate is a question of law
based on underlying mixed questions of law and fact, and is subject to de novo review”).
128. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (abrogating the two-part test of In re Seagate and the tripartite
framework of review).
129. See id. at 1933 (stating that culpable behavior is indicative of egregious misconduct); see also
United States v. Kiestler, Nos. 92-5099, 92-5600, 92-5601, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13092, at *6 (6th
Cir. May 21, 1993) (“The determination of a defendant’s degree of culpability is a question of
fact . . . .”).
130. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
131. Herda, supra note 39, at 193 (noting how the Supreme Court deemphasized the
law/fact-determination test for determining if a jury trial is needed to preserve a legal right).
132. Id. (stating the two separate tests to determine if a legal right exists).
133. Id. at 193–94 (finding that “[i]ncreased damages under § 284 are analogous to punitive damage
awards . . .” and offering four comparisons regarding how the two are similar).
134. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (2016) (“We continued to describe
enhanced damages as ‘vindictive or punitive,’ which the court may ‘inflict’ when ‘the circumstances of
the case appear to require it.’”); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (“Enhanced damages not only operate as a punitive measure against individual infringing
defendants, but they also serve an overarching purpose as a deterrence of patent infringement.”).
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those early cases, juries determined punitive damages.135 Therefore,
this connection between punitive damages and enhanced damages in
patent law seems to suggest that the second prong of the Markman
historical test, or whether the issue “must fall to the jury in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in
1791,” would require the jury to determine enhanced damages.136
However, there remains firm disagreement as to whether a judge
and not a jury should consider punitive damages.137 One argument
for allowing the judge to determine whether to award punitive
damages is that “judges are in a better position to impose a
punishment that is in line with the punishments imposed for similar
misconduct, [and] determination of the amount of punitive damages
by judges would promote the interest in treating like cases alike.”138
However, history still indicates that punitive damages were a legal
right in England prior to 1791.139 If the issue of enhanced damages
makes it past the first question in the Markman test, a successful
analogy to punitive damages will pass the second question of the test,
thus establishing a right to trial by jury on enhanced damages.140

135. Herda, supra note 39, at 196–97 (discussing the origins of punitive damages as they first
surfaced around 1763).
136. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
137. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 596 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating in
the context of awarding punitive damages that one cannot “expect those jurors to interpret law like
judges, who work within a discipline and hierarchical organization that normally promotes roughly
uniform interpretation and application of the law”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and
Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) (“Some observers
suggest that allowing judges, not juries, to set punitive award levels will improve civil justice.”). But see
Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 521 N.W.2d 921, 926 (S.D. 1994) (“Blinders should not be placed
on a jury when it is called upon to assess punishment, i.e., punitive damages.”).
138. Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 179, 212
(1998).
139. Id. at 183 (stating that, although the punitive damages of today are different than those in
England prior to 1791, punitive damages did exist as early as 1763 in England).
140. Herda, supra note 39, at 198 (concluding that enhanced damages pass the first part of the
Markman test and pass the second part of the test because of enhanced damages’ connection to punitive
damages).

Published by Reading Room, 2018

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3

410

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

C. A Stare-Decisis Approach to Section 284
Precedent may also help establish who—judge or jury—should
decide if enhanced damages ought to be rewarded.141 After the Act of
1836 provided district courts with discretion to enhance damages, the
inquiry remained within the control of the trial judge.142 In Seymour
v. McCormick, an important case regarding the interpretation of the
Act of 1836, the Supreme Court stated, “The power to inflict
vindictive or punitive damages is committed to the discretion and
judgment of the court within the limit of trebling the actual damages
found by the jury.”143 Sole determination by the judge remained the
procedure for more than one hundred years after the Act of 1836.144
A question-of-fact analysis only surfaced when the notion of
willfulness became a test around the mid-1950s,145 and the
determination of “willfulness” caught on as the pivotal question
around the creation of the Federal Circuit.146 Early use of
willfulness—prior to the Federal Circuit—was merely advisory, and
141. See Wisnia & Jackman, supra note 12, at 474 (concluding that no pre-1791 precedent could help
in a Markman test, and thus resorting to precedent to help establish the procedure).
142. See cases supra note 32.
143. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 489 (1853).
144. See, e.g., Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964) (“No discretion is vested
in the jury; but they are required to find the actual damages, under proper instructions from the court.”);
White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.2d
287 (5th Cir. 1975) (“In these areas, however, the jury verdict was advisory only since trebling of
damages in patent cases is always entrusted to the discretion of the Court in jury as well as non-jury
trials.”); Vaughan v. Central Pac. R. Co., 28 F. Cas. 1107, 1107 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877) (No. 16, 987).
145. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, 13 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D. Mass. 1952). A search for
“willfulness” or “willful” within the same paragraph of “enhanced damages” or “treble” in LexisNexis
reveals the terms were not used together until the mid-1950s. One of the first cases discussing the matter
of willfulness came in 1952, coincidentally around the Patent Act of 1952. Id.
146. A similar search as completed in supra note 145 shows the words “willful” or “willfulness”
within the same paragraph as “enhanced damages” or “treble” a total of three times in the 1950s, a total
of ten times in the 1960s, a total of seven times in the 1970s, and a total of forty-seven times in the
1980s. See, e.g., Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1072 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Further, interrogatories
could have covered the willfulness of infringement to provide support for the award of the treble
damages.”); White, 369 F. Supp. at 1326 (“In so doing the Court included interrogatories designed to
elicit the jury’s findings with respect to the willfulness of the alleged infringement and whether the
compensatory damages should be trebled.”); Hartford Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F.
Supp. 353, 358 (D. Del. 1960) (“[I]t bears directly on the willfulness and the treble damages.”). The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created on October 1, 1982, to have exclusive jurisdiction
for appeals regarding patents. Matthew B. Weiss, Options for Federal Circuit Reform Derived from
German Legal Structure and Practice, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 358, 361 (2015).
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the judge weighed a jury’s finding of willful infringement with all
other circumstances when deciding if enhanced damages were
appropriate.147 Although the Federal Circuit later held that
evidentiary findings by juries on willfulness are non-advisory, the
holding had very limited consequence—the judge can still refrain
from awarding enhanced damages or even overturn a finding of nowillfulness and award damages as a matter of law.148
Therefore, even after willfulness became a main part of the
enhanced damages consideration, and even after the Federal Circuit
in In re Seagate created their two-part framework for willful
infringement, judges regularly decided whether to award enhanced
damages.149 Two cases prompted the Supreme Court to visit the issue
of enhanced damages.150 In the case Halo Electronics v. Pulse
Electronics, the district court declined to award enhanced damages
even after a jury found a high probability that the defendants
“willfully” infringed on the patent, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed.151 In the other case, Stryker Corporation v. Zimmer, Inc.,
the jury found willful infringement and the court awarded the
damages to the plaintiff.152 Applying a de novo standard of review,
147. White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he jury’s finding that defendants
willfully infringed and therefore that the compensatory damages should be trebled is advisory only.”);
Square Liner 360 Degrees, Inc. v. Chisum, No. 4-76-Civ. 134, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17776, at *38 (D.
Minn. Nov. 2, 1981) “[T]he jury’s finding on willfulness or lack thereof is merely advisory . . . and the
Court may increase the jury’s damage award if upon its own examination of all the circumstances the
Court should find such an increase justified . . . .”).
148. Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“All fact findings of a
jury are non-advisory, unless made in an area expressly removed from jury verdict.”). In summarizing
the reasoning in Shiley, one article states the role of the jury in enhanced damages as follows:
The jury’s findings on willfulness are non-advisory, but they have limited
consequences. If the jury finds that the defendant did willfully infringe
the patents, the court has discretion to refrain from awarding
increased damages. If the jury finds no willfulness, the court may overturn
the ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and
award treble damages.
Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent
Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 109–10 (2001).
149. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930–31 (2016) (discussing the two
cases that prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the issue of enhanced damages).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1931.
152. Id.
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the Federal Circuit vacated the enhanced damages by finding the
defendant asserted reasonable defenses to the infringement.153
Therefore, even though the Seagate test was used in both cases, the
outcomes demonstrated how willfulness remained a legal question
for the judge’s determination.154
However, the final outcome of Halo v. Pulse was an abrogation of
the Seagate test.155 In Halo, the Supreme Court did not hold that
willfulness was the overall determinant for “egregious” cases of
misconduct.156 The Court instead stated that egregious misconduct is
typified by willful misconduct.157 Since the decision, the Federal
Circuit continues to read willfulness into the inquiry of “egregious”
misconduct.158 The Federal Circuit reinforced its intent to retain its
willfulness precedent by stating it “do[es] not interpret Halo as
changing the established law that the factual components of the
willfulness question should be resolved by the jury.”159 However, the
Federal Circuit did go on to state:
[Halo] leaves in place [the] prior precedent that there is a
right to a jury trial on the willfulness question . . . .
Whether the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to warrant
enhancement and the amount of the enhancement that is
appropriate are committed to the sound discretion of the
district court.160

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1930–31.
155. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (abrogating the two-part framework of In re Seagate).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1934 (“Consistent with nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent law,
however, such punishment should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful
misconduct.”).
158. See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding on arguments
of willfulness in the context of enhanced damages after Halo v. Pulse).
159. Id. at 1341.
160. Id. at 1341 n.13.
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Therefore, the Federal Circuit continues to hold that willfulness is a
question of fact, but the ultimate determination of egregiousness is a
question of law.161
In the wake of Halo v. Pulse, district courts began using different
approaches to determine egregious misconduct.162 Some courts now
completely rely upon the nine Read v. Portec factors created prior to
the Seagate test.163 These factors ask the court to determine:
(1) Whether [the] infringer deliberately copied; (2)
Whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent,
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a goodfaith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed;
(3) The infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; (4)
Infringer’s size and financial condition; (5) Closeness of
the case; (6) Duration of the infringer’s misconduct; (7)
Remedial action by the infringer; (8) Infringer’s motivation
for harm; and (9) Infringer’s attempt to conceal its
misconduct.164
Even the Read factors implicate some “evidentiary underpinnings”
that “[fall] somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact.”165 For instance, deliberate copying—factor one—can
be seen as synonymous with “willful infringement.”166 Such a
161. See id.
162. Bruce Barker, A Review of Post-Halo Decisions on Enhanced Damages, CHAO HADIDI STARK
AND BARKER LLP (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.chsblaw.com/single-post/2016/08/12/Under-Halo-TestFor-Enhanced-Damages-Jury-First-Determines-the-Infringers-Willful-Intent-then-Judge-AssessesEgregiousness [https://perma.cc/VR8X-D333] (discussing the factors district courts are using to
determine enhanced damages after the decision in Halo v. Pulse).
163. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Barker, supra note 162.
164. Barker, supra note 162.
165. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838, 842 (2015) (quoting Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388, 390 (1996)). Teva v. Sandoz expanded the holding
in Markman—that claim construction is a question of law despite the “evidentiary underpinnings” of the
issue—and held that the evidentiary underpinnings found by the judge are to be reviewed under the
clear-error standard. Id. at 842.
166. See Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136728, at *61
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that copying is a lesser standard than willful because the alleged
infringer went to a trade show before the infringement, and that “supports the inference the accused
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correlation makes it seem that the factual inquiries of willfulness
would also be considered in determining if deliberate copying
existed.167 Furthermore, factor five considers the closeness of the
case.168 Closeness of the case depends, in part, on the strength of the
evidence for invalidity or infringement.169 Therefore, even this factor
mixes both questions of fact and questions of law.170
In the future, a determination of whether the judge or the jury
decides if the conduct was “egregious” will help litigants know the
likelihood of treble damages;171 will limit the progress of
infringement trials by shortening how much time is spent on showing
malicious intent;172 and will lower the cost of litigation by decreasing
the abuse of willfulness allegations.173 Therefore, a determination
infringer ‘was at least reckless as to whether it copied’”); CleanCut, LLC v. Rug Doctor, Inc., No. 2:08cv-836, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16151, at *7–8 (D. Utah Feb. 4, 2013) (using the defendant’s
“willful decision to offer substantially similar” products in determining the first Read factor weighed in
favor of enhanced damages).
167. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016). In Halo the jury held
that the defendant “all-but instructed its design team to copy Stryker’s products,” and this information
was used in determining willful infringement. Id.
168. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827.
169. Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136728 at *65 (holding factor five as neutral
because “[t]he affirmative defenses of invalidity due to prior art and obviousness were close calls.”);
Arthur S. Beeman & Jeff Leung, How The ‘Read Factors’ Can Help Software Cos. Post-Halo, LAW360
(Sept. 12, 2016, 12:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/836590/how-the-read-factors-can-helpsoftware-cos-post-halo [https://perma.cc/8BDG-87HR] (stating that courts look “[i]n favor of enhanced
damages where strong evidence in support of infringement and against all invalidity theories”).
170. See Frederick L. Whitmer, Claim Construction in Patent Cases: A Question of Law?, 2
LANDSLIDE, no. 6, July/Aug. 2010, at 4 (“Post-Framing precedent, moreover, characterizes the question
of construing the patent as a question for the court and determining infringement as a question of fact for
the jury.”); Maryann T. Puglielli, Obviousness, a Question of Law and Fact, Is Reviewable on JMOL in
Certain Cases, FINNEGAN (Aug. 2010), http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/FCN_Aug10_3.html
[https://perma.cc/2LU2-ZEB5] (discussing how motivation to combine—in the scope of obviousness
and thus invalidity—is considered a question of fact, but when factual inquiries are not at issue, the
issue is a question of law).
171. See Moore, supra note 41, at 393 (“Juries find willfulness in almost three of four cases (71%)
and judges only find it half the time (53%), suggesting that juries are more easily convinced of an
infringer’s thieving intent.”).
172. See Wisnia & Jackman, supra note 12, at 478–79 (“If defendants know that a jury will be
considering their litigation behavior in the context of enhanced damages they will likely shift their
behavior. Judges, unlike juries, are likely immunized to a certain extent by some of the more abusive
litigation tactics that parties use.”).
173. See Means, supra note 106, at 2014 (“Willfulness claims are unnecessarily costing courts and
litigants a fortune because: (1) patent litigation is expensive, (2) willfulness claims constitute a
substantial proportion of that expense, (3) willfulness is almost always alleged in patent litigation, and
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must be made as to whether the judge or the jury determines if the
infringing conduct should result in enhanced damages.
III. Proposal
Halo v. Pulse provided district courts with broad discretion to
determine an infringing act’s egregiousness.174 The case also held
that willfulness is not the ultimate question in determining whether
enhanced damages are appropriate.175 Therefore, because
egregiousness is the ultimate question, the Read factors provide a
solid framework to assist the district court judge on the issue of
egregiousness.176 Additionally, statutory interpretation, precedent,
and the technical nature of patent infringement suggest that any
factual determinations made regarding egregiousness should be
considered solely by the judge.177 Therefore, a logical approach to
ensure uniformity and finality to an enhanced damages award is to
create a post-trial evidentiary hearing on the issue.178
A. Willfulness Is Not the Ultimate Question
1. The Read Factors Appropriately Address Egregiousness
It must first be recognized that willful infringement is not the main
question to ask when considering enhanced damages; rather,
egregious misconduct is merely typified by willful infringement.179
Precedent considering willfulness as mere guidance for assessing the

(4) infringement is almost never found to be willful.”).
174. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the abrogation of the In re Seagate framework and holding that
a determination of egregious misconduct is in the discretion of the district court).
175. See id.; see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (stating
egregious misconduct is typified by willful misconduct).
176. See infra Part III.A.1.
177. See infra Part III.A.2.
178. See infra Part III.B.
179. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“And while the Court
explains that ‘intentional or knowing’ infringement ‘may’ warrant a punitive sanction, the word it uses
is may, not must . . . . It is ‘circumstanc[e]’ that transforms simple knowledge into such egregious
behavior, and that makes all the difference.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2018

27

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3

416

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

totality of the circumstances predates the Federal Circuit.180 The
Federal Circuit also noted that egregiousness was the ultimate
question in its 1992 Read v. Portec decision.181 Finally, the Court, in
deciding In re Seagate, attempted to clarify that willfulness is not the
ultimate question, but merely an important factor of egregiousness,
by stating the following:
To be sure, the majority rule has been that an award of
enhanced damages pursuant to section 284 requires a
finding of willfulness. However, the existence of this
“longstanding controversy” adequately demonstrates that
Congress was not merely reenacting consistentlyinterpreted statutory language with the 1952 Act so as to
justify the inference suggested in GM. Therefore, I am of
the judgment that this court should not continue to read a
willfulness requirement into section 284, to support the
enhancement of damages. That said, willfulness remains a
relevant consideration under section 284.182
Therefore, when the Federal Circuit defined the scope of willfulness
in In re Seagate, willfulness continued to be the pivotal question
regarding enhancement.183 In Halo v. Pulse, the Supreme Court
clarified that more than willfulness should be considered because
“Section 284 permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a
manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test,” and
“courts should continue to take into account the particular

180. White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
509 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the jury finding of willfulness was advisory for the court to
use in their determination); Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
181. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A] finding of willful
infringement does not mandate that damages be enhanced, much less mandate treble damages.”).
182. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
183. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1926. The Supreme Court found it important to abrogate the In re
Seagate test because the determination of enhanced damages became too rigid. Id. at 1930, 1932.
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circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award
damages.”184
The Federal Circuit originally created the Read factors to help
determine egregiousness.185 Although some courts used willfulness
as a “first-step” test for enhanced damages and then used the Read
factors to determine the degree of enhancement,186 the proper use of
the Read factors was, and still is, to determine the level of
egregiousness and, in turn, whether enhanced damages are
appropriate.187 This does not mean that willfulness is not an
important aspect of determining egregious misconduct.188 The Read
factors actually do consider the issue of willfulness. For instance,
factor one asks if the alleged infringer deliberately copied the
claimed invention.189 Deliberate copying may not, however, require
willful copying, given that “the Federal Circuit held that willfulness
does not require intentional infringement.”190 The Federal Circuit
also held, however, that willfulness is a sliding scale that includes
deliberateness: “‘Willfulness’ in infringement, as in life, is not an allor-nothing trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that infringement
may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless,
disregard of a patentee’s legal rights.”191 Therefore, since the Read
184. Id. at 1933–34 (2016).
185. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826 (“The paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement
and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and
circumstances.”).
186. See Cognex Corp. v. Microscan Sys., No. 13-CV-2027, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91203, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2014) (citations omitted) (“Although ‘[a] finding of willful infringement is a
prerequisite to the award of enhanced damages, . . . [w]hether—and how much—to enhance an award of
damages is determined by ‘the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and
circumstances.’”); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17717, at
*11–19 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014) (considering Seagate as the “first step of the test” for determining
willful infringement, and then using the Read factors to determine amount of enhancement).
187. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826 (emphasis added) (“The paramount determination in deciding to
grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all
the facts and circumstances.”).
188. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (“The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously
described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful,
flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.”).
189. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827.
190. Czanik, supra note 48, at 287.
191. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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factors appropriately determine if the case was sufficiently egregious
to justify enhancing damages, the trial judge should use the factors in
her determination. The judge should also consider willfulness as
supplementing the Read factors while determining if the totality of
the circumstances justify enhanced damages.
2. The Judge, Not the Jury, Should Determine Willfulness
As discussed above, willfulness is a very important aspect in
determining the egregiousness of the infringement. Although it has
long been understood that courts have the discretion to decide the
amount of the enhancement,192 Halo v. Pulse made it clear that the
court also enjoys the broad discretion of determining whether
enhanced damages are appropriate.193 Even so, patent damages can
be multiplied by any number from one to three times the amount of
actual damages found by the jury.194 If the judge has the authority to
only multiply the damages by one, then it really does not matter if a
jury decides if the infringement was willful or egregious.195
Therefore, the judge should similarly have the authority to make the
determination on the substantive issue of willful or egregious
infringement.
Furthermore, an alleged infringer does not have the right to a trial
by jury for three reasons. First, Section 284’s text clearly indicates
that the statute does not confer the right to trial by jury on the
question of enhanced damages.196 The section states, “When the
damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the
192. Morris, supra note 72, at 446 (“[T]he court, not the jury, decides whether to multiply the actual
damages by a number between 1 and 3.”).
193. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (citation omitted) (“It ‘commits the determination’ whether enhanced
damages are appropriate ‘to the discretion of the district court’ and ‘that decision is to be reviewed on
appeal for abuse of discretion.’”).
194. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836).
195. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the limited consequence of the jury’s
findings if the judge determines how much to increase the actual damages).
196. See supra Part II.A (discussing a similarity to copyright law and how the term “court” means
“judge”).
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amount found or assessed.”197 The Fifth Circuit agreed that “court”
meant “judge” by acknowledging that substituting the word judge or
jury into Section 284 would create ambiguity by essentially allowing
the statute to “read nonsensically: ‘When the damages are not found
by a jury, the (jury or judge) . . . shall assess them.’”198
Second, the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a trial by jury
for enhanced damages. Although the Federal Circuit stated that Halo
v. Pulse “leaves in place [the] prior precedent that there is a right to a
jury trial on the willfulness question,”199 this legal conclusion has
differing precedent. The Fifth Circuit, prior to the creation of the
Federal Circuit, held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to
enhanced damages because the idea of enhanced damages is new to
American patent law, and the Act of 1836 made clear that only actual
damages are determined by the jury.200 In fact, use of the Markman
test for determining Seventh Amendment rights, see supra Part
II.B.1, clarifies that no right to trial by jury is required for enhanced
damages.201
Finally, judges are in a better position than juries to decide
willfulness and egregiousness due to a judge’s ability to consider
technical, yet objective facts—such as knowledge of a similar patent
or possibility of infringement.202 Markman stressed that there are
situations that blur the line between fact and law, and sometimes
“one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the
issue in question.”203 The case of enhanced damages in patent
infringement presents one of those situations. Some questions in
patent law impose complexities for which the judge is “better suited
to separate subjective inquiry facts from objective inquiry facts.”204
197. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
198. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1964).
199. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
200. See Swofford, 336 F.2d at 412–13.
201. Pegram, supra note 108, at 280 (“No case was found in which a British jury addressed the issue
of increased awards or punitive damages in a patent infringement case.”).
202. Czanik, supra note 48, at 297–98.
203. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
204. Czanik, supra note 48, at 298.
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For example, many of the Read factors are better suited for a judge
who has more training in the highly technical field of patent law.
Factor two asks whether the infringer formed a good-faith belief that
the patent was invalid.205 Claim construction is very important to
whether a patent claim is valid, and Markman decided that claim
construction, even though it contains many factual elements, is more
appropriately determined by the judge; interpreting written
instruments, especially in the highly technical area of patent
litigation, is something judges often do.206 Additionally, deliberate
copying contains elements of willfulness, or at least culpability, and
“[a] jury lacks the experience acquired from years of sitting on the
bench in determining which actions constitute objective
recklessness.”207 Therefore, many aspects of egregiousness are, and
have been determined to be, clearly appropriate for a judge to decide.
B. An Evidentiary Hearing for Egregiousness
1. The Test and Approach
Since willful or egregious infringement shares many of the factual
and legal questions found in claim construction, the holding and
aftermath of Markman proves helpful in analyzing the appropriate
handling of egregious misconduct. The Supreme Court believed that
judges would not only more accurately determine claim construction,
but would also create more uniformity in how claims are construed
across jurisdictions.208 The holding in Markman created the
“Markman hearing,” which judges conduct solely to construe a
205. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
206. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–89.
207. Czanik, supra note 48, at 298.
208. Timothy M. Salmon, Procedural Uncertainty in Markman Hearings: When Will the Federal
Circuit Show the Way, 18 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 1031, 1032–33 (2004) (stating that the Supreme Court
held that the trial court’s ability to interpret legal documents put them in a better position to interpret
patent claims); see also Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The
Supreme Court Giveth and The Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 244 (2002)
(stating that a jury’s ability to sense human conduct is not as important in claim construction, and a
judge’s determination will create more uniformity in decisions).
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patent’s claims.209 A similar evidentiary hearing on egregiousness
would prove beneficial to separate egregiousness from the issues of
validity and infringement. Unlike in the Markman hearing, where the
judge can either hold the hearing before considering infringement or
later, before instructing the jury,210 the most beneficial time to hold
an Enhanced Damages hearing would be after a post-trial motion to
address the issue.211 Enhanced damages depend on whether the jury
finds actual damages,212 and therefore the hearing can only take place
after the jury concludes there was infringement and imposes actual
damages. In these hearings, the judge will be able to make use of the
evidentiary findings made at the trial. Furthermore, the hearing could
be treated similar to a Markman hearing in regard to extrinsic
evidence. Evidence not previously gathered during the course of the
trial could supplement the decision of the trial judge if, and only if,
the evidence at trial is not sufficiently persuasive to address the
infringement’s egregiousness.213
2. The Benefits of a Post-Trial Enhanced Damages Hearing
The benefit of a judge holding a post-trial hearing is three-fold.
First, it will reduce prejudice toward the alleged infringer during the
trial.214 Issues of culpability will not be the main focus of the trial if
209. Salmon, supra note 208, at 1034.
210. Patent Tips, MARKMAN HEARING, http://www.markmanhearing.org/ [https://perma.cc/8TQM6KDN] (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).
211. See Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that a finding of
“willfulness, deliberateness, and increased damages should properly await final judgment”); ANDREW J.
PINCUS & BRIAN A. ROSENTHAL, MAYER BROWN, WHAT’S WILLFUL NOW? THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S HALO V. PULSE PATENT WILLFULNESS DECISION 15 (2016),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Event/6c269db6-c384-4830-aa4e557199cd36d5/Presentation/EventAttachment/fbd4fcfb-7525-462b-aff8-8082e410cbec/160616-WDCIP-WEBINAR-Halo-Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FTW-AXXK] (discussing how litigants may now
begin asking for post-trial motions, outside the presence of the jury, on the issue of willfulness).
212. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
213. See Salmon, supra note 208, at 1035 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1584
(Fed. Cir. 1996)) (stating that extrinsic evidence should only be used in a Markman hearing when there
is “still some genuine ambiguity in the claims, after consideration of the all available intrinsic
evidence”).
214. Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227,
235 (2004) (“Willfulness evidence is among the most prejudicial and damages evidence among the most
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willfulness is not at question when the ultimate issue of infringement
is decided.215 Including information about the culpability of the
alleged infringer at trial has a tendency to confuse the jury on other
issues at trial—namely on validity and infringement.216 This will
protect the defendant from a presumption of infringement due to any
bad-faith practices undertaken in the course of their business or
during litigation.217
Second, a post-trial hearing on enhanced damages has the benefit
of increasing the efficiency of the trial. Claims of willful
infringement add another dimension to the trial and thus expend
greater resources during the trial.218 The threat of willful
infringement alone increases the cost of the litigation, as resources
will certainly be spent trying to defend the alleged infringer’s
conduct surrounding the infringement.219 Since less than 2% of all
patent cases ever reach the merits of willful infringement, and less
than 5% of patent cases are even decided at trial,220 determining
willful infringement in a post-trial hearing will stop unnecessary
litigation of willful infringement in cases that do not even reach their
merits.221
complex. Eliminating this evidence from the trial would greatly simplify the issues and the trial.”).
215. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 148, at 94 (discussing how bifurcation of invalidity and
willfulness can lower the prejudice towards the infringer).
216. See Moore, supra note 41, at 369–70 (discussing the biases juries have towards litigants and how
juries are swayed by tangential factors such as willfulness). As discussed in Part III.B.1, the Read
factors should be used by the judge in determining egregiousness. Therefore, other factors, such as
whether the infringer “knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and
formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed” will be considered in a posttrial, Enhanced Damages hearing. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). These
factors can also create a presumptive “willfulness” in the eyes of the jury, and therefore create the same
type of confusion as “willfulness.” See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 46, at 1091–92.
217. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 46, at 1091–92.
218. Means, supra note 106, at 2016 (citations omitted) (stating that even though patent infringement
does not ask about the culpability of the infringer, “[w]illfulness under the current law requires an
inquiry into what the alleged infringer knew or should have known. Willfulness is therefore a factor that
‘increases the cost and decreases the predictability of patent infringement litigation . . . .’”); Moore,
supra note 214, at 235.
219. Moore, supra note 214, at 235.
220. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 436 (2012).
221. See Moore, supra note 214, at 232 (discussing how 92% of all patent infringement cases
included a claim of willful infringement without any factual support).
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Finally, allowing a judge to determine egregiousness in a post-trial
hearing will create consistency across jurisdictions. Judges are better
positioned to make determinations of objective facts such as
knowledge of a similar patent or possibility of infringement.222 Prior
to In re Seagate, one study found there was no statisticallysignificant difference when a judge or a jury found willful
infringement.223 After In re Seagate, judges began declining
enhanced damages awards because they regarded the evidence
considered by the jury as particularly weak.224 It is understood “that
when the evidence supporting a jury’s willfulness findings is
relatively weak, it is appropriate for the district court to not award
enhanced damages.”225 Therefore, now that courts no longer use the
Seagate test, a judge deciding the issue of enhanced damages in a
post-trial hearing will not significantly differ from a jury deciding
that issue.226 Also, a judge will not be inclined to disregard enhanced
damages based on the weak evidence a jury considers. If the judge
decides the infringement was egregious, then the judge will enhance
the actual damages and the decision is final.
3. The Standard of Review
The standard of review is a very important element for promoting
the consistency of decisions. In Halo v. Pulse, the Supreme Court
granted district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages.227
The Court’s intent was to “allow[] district courts to punish the full
range of culpable behavior.”228 What the Court did not address was
the situation where the judge was acting as the fact finder—as would
be the case in a post-trial hearing on enhanced damages. In
Markman, the Supreme Court discussed this situation: the judge is in
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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the best position to make determinations, but the inquiry includes
“evidentiary underpinnings.”229 Even though the district court has the
broad discretion to determine if enhanced damages are appropriate,
subsidiary fact-finding—such as credibility of witnesses or extrinsic
evidence—will be necessary in a post-trial, Enhanced Damages
hearing.230
The Supreme Court’s holding in Teva v. Sandoz is helpful to the
situation, as in an Enhanced Damages hearing, where the judge will
be making some historically-factual findings. The Court in Teva held
that both Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
precedent suggest that issues that include factual determinations
necessitate a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.231 There the
Court separated decisions about claim construction from the district
court’s legal determinations on the construction—factual
determinations regarding the construction are to be reviewed for clear
error, while the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim is
reviewed de novo.232 A similar method would create consistency in
enhanced damages inquiries by potentially lowering the Federal
Circuit’s reversal rates.233 Factual determinations made by the judge
in a post-trial hearing could be reviewed for clear error while the
actual award of enhanced damages would be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. This would help create “national uniformity, consistency,
and finality”234 for enhanced damages awards by requiring the

229. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–90 (1996).
230. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (discussing the
“evidentiary underpinnings” that come up when analyzing claim construction).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 841.
233. See Supreme Court Holds That Certain Aspects of Claim Construction Decisions Merit
Deference on Appeal, WOLF GREENFIELD (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.wolfgreenfield.com/publications/ip-alerts/2015/aspects-of-claim-construction-decisionsmerit-deference [https://perma.cc/YJ4G-6X53] (discussing how a de novo standard of review by the
Federal Circuit in claim construction creates unpredictability and high reversal rates on the issue). This
statement suggests that a judge’s factual findings regarding willfulness should be reviewed only for
clear error. A clear error standard, as opposed to a de novo standard, could help to reduce the Federal
Circuit’s ability to reverse a finding of willfulness. See id.
234. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
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Federal Circuit to give deference to the district court’s fact-finding.235
This strong standard of district court discretion is, after all, the intent
of Section 284.236
CONCLUSION
The issue of enhanced damages in patent law has transformed a
great deal since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.237
Although the Federal Circuit developed different tests to assist in
determining willful infringement, the Supreme Court held in Halo v.
Pulse that the ultimate issue is the egregiousness of the infringement,
and the district court has broad discretion to consider evidence of
whether to impose enhanced damages.238 The question remains
whether a judge should determine willfulness, regardless of whether
it is the ultimate question for enhanced damages.
Although the Federal Circuit continues to consider willfulness as a
question of fact for the jury to decide,239 there is evidence that
willfulness considerations in enhanced damages are not subject to the
guarantees of a jury trial. The statute does not suggest that Congress
intended to confer such a right;240 no common-law right significantly
similar to enhanced damages existed prior to the ratification of the
Seventh Amendment,241 and early precedent suggests that judges
alone tried the issue of enhanced damages.242
Since a judge has the authority to make the decision on enhanced
damages, creating a post-trial hearing on enhanced damages, similar
235. See Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz, PATENTLY-O
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deference-supreme-sandoz.html (discussing how
viewing factual determinations through the clear-error standard may result in fewer reversals).
236. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016) (“Section 284
permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the
Seagate test.”).
237. See discussions supra Parts I.B, I.C.
238. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
239. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
240. See supra Part II.A (discussing a similarity to copyright law and how the term “court” means
“judge”).
241. Pegram, supra note 108, at 280.
242. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1964).
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to the Markman hearings on claim construction, would foster judicial
efficiency on the issue. In this hearing, the judge will consider the
nine Read factors in deciding, under the totality of the circumstances,
whether the infringement was egregious.243 In evaluating the nine
factors, the judge can consider willfulness of the infringement in her
determination. The judge should feel free to include willfulness
inquiries in the factors that overlap with intent, such as “deliberate
copying” in factor one; the judge should also feel free to include
willful or malicious intent while determining the “closeness of the
case.”
Finally, the evidentiary conclusions made by the judge would be
reviewed for clear error. However, the decision of whether and how
much to enhance damages would continue to be reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Allowing judges to assess willful, egregious
infringement will reduce prejudice at trial, increase judicial
efficiency, and foster predictable outcomes in litigation.244 This
method provides the district court the broad discretion granted by the
clear language of 35 U.S.C. § 284.245

243. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
244. See supra Part III.B.2.
245. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016). In summarizing the
broad discretion of the district court judge, which the Supreme Court understands Section 284 grants,
the Court stated the following:
Section 284 allows district courts to punish the full range of culpable
behavior. Yet none of this is to say that enhanced damages must follow a
finding of egregious misconduct. As with any exercise of discretion, courts
should continue to consider the particular circumstances of each case in
deciding whether to award damages, and in what amount. Section 284
permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the
inelastic constraints of the Seagate test.
Id.
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